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LEGISLATION- FOREIGN RELATIONS - INTERNATIONAL
TRADE REAUTHORIZATION FOR THE OVERSEAS PRIVATE
INVESTMENT CORPORATION
A new foreign aid policy proposed by the Reagan Administra-
tion would put greater emphasis on the role of private United
States investors in bilateral assistance programs with lesser
developed countries (LDC's).' While this approach does reflect the
political conservatism of the current Washington leadership, the
planned reductions in existing foreign aid programs seem to be
based on budgetary considerations rather than any fundamental
shifts in policy.' One government agency particularly well-suited
for implementing this new approach is the Overseas Private In-
vestment Corporation (OPIC). OPIC's express statutory purpose
is "to mobilize and facilitate the participation of United States
private capital and skills in the economic and social development
of less developed friendly countries and areas, thereby complemen-
ting the development assistance objectives of the United States."3
Subject to periodic review and reauthorization by Congress, OPIC
would have ceased to operate as an entity on September 30, 1981,
without further enabling legislation. Saving legislation approved
at the last minute extended OPIC's operating authority for an ad-
ditional four years. The final version of that legislation is entitled
The Overseas Private Investment Corporation Amendments Act of
1981.1
The Overseas Private Investment Corporation was formed in
1969 by an amendment 5 to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.6
1 Janssen, Reagan Team Hopes to Cut Foreign Aid Burden by Encouraging Private Pro-
jects in Third World, Wall St. J., Apr. 14, 1981, at 56, col. 1.
2 1 [1981] MAJOR LEGISLATION OF THE CONGRESS, 97th Cong., mlc-026 (May 1981). The revised
budget for fiscal year-1982 would reduce total foreign development assistance by $1,877
million. Funding for the Agency for International Development [AID] alone would be cut
by some $486 million. Furthermore the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has recom-
mended that AID programs be reoriented to encourage more private sector participation.
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ADDITIONAL
DETAILS ON BUDGET SAVINGS 323, 329 (1981).
3 22 U.S.C. S 2191 (1976).
' Overseas Private Investment Corporation, Amendments Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-65,
1981 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (95 Stat.) 1021 (to be codified at 22 U.S.C. SS 2191-22006)
[hereinafter cited as Pub. L. No. 97-65].
1 Foreign Assistance Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-175, S 105, 83 Stat. 805, 807 (codified
as amended at 22 U.S.C. SS 2191-2200a) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-195, 75 Stat. 424 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 22 U.S.C.).
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. [Vol. 12:251
Created as an independent United States agency,7 OPIC was
designed to operate as a self-sustaining corporation requiring no
more than start-up appropriations from Congress.' While the broad
policy objective of the agency is foreign development assistance,
OPIC specifically provides political risk insurance and financial
assistance for United States investors as encouragement for private
investment in countries perceived as economically or politically
unstable.9 OPIC is empowered to insure against the risk of incon-
vertibility of foreign currency;'0 government expropriation of pri-
vate property;" and loss due to war, revolution, or insurrection. 2
OPIC financial assistance programs include the issuance of loan
guaranties for United States investors," direct investment loans
to qualifying businesses,' and general pre-investment consultation.15
In its twelve year history, OPIC often has been the subject of
criticism. In its formative years, there was a widely held belief
in Congress that OPIC involvement in foreign investments was
"more likely to embroil the United States in the internal politics
of host countries than would otherwise be the case."'" Organized
' As of this writing OPIC is still under the nominal direction of the International Develop-
ment and Cooperation Agency [IDCA]. IDCA was created on Oct. 1, 1979, as a part of Presi-
dent Carter's Reorganization Plan No. 2. This umbrella agency was set up to coordinate
the activities of IAD, OPIC, and a new Agency to be called the Institute for Scientific
and Technological Coordination. Lipman, Overseas Private Investment Corporation: Current
Authority and Programs, 5 N.C. J. L. & COM. REG. 337,339 (1980). IDCA however has never
become fully operative. The Administrator of AID has been serving as Acting Director
of IDCA, as well as Chairman of the Board of OPIC, since IDCA's creation. No funds were
allocated to complete its staffing in the 1982 budget. The Senate, characterizing the agen-
cy as "nothing more than another bureaucratic layer," has proposed its abolishment. If
this occurs, OPIC would formally regain its status as an independent agency. S. REP. No.
83, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 18, reprinted in [1981] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2404, 2421
[hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 83].
SExtension and Revision of Overseas Private Investment Corporation Programs: Hearings
and Markup of H.R. 8136 Before the Subcomm. on International Economic Policy and Trade
of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs. 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 65 (1981) (statement of Craig
A. Nalen, President, OPIC) [hereinafter cited as 1981 OPIC House Hearings].
Id. at 68-69.
I0 22 U.S.C. S 2194(aXIXA) (1976).
22 U.S.C. S 2194(aX1XB) (1976).
12 22 U.S.C. S 2194(aX1XC) (1976).
18 22 U.S.C. S 2194(b) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
22 U.S.C. S 2194(c) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). The corporation is to give preferential
consideration to small business.
's 22 U.S.C. S 2194(d) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). This includes the preparation of invest-
ment surveys and feasibility studies, sometimes through the stage of pilot operations. This
type of assistance generally is afforded to small business. 5 N.C. J. L. & CoM. REG. 337,
362, supra note 7.
11 S. REP. No. 676, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1974), reprinted in [19741 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 4517, 4538. Specific examples in Chile, Jamaica, and Taiwan were alluded to where it
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labor groups complained that OPIC was causing the loss of United
States worker jobs to "runaway industries"; whereas, OPIC
favorable insurance rates were perceived as a subsidy to big
business. 7 Moreover, Congress found insufficient evidence at the
time to suggest that the availability of OPIC programs was a signifi-
cant consideration in private investment decision-making. 8 As a
result of such early opposition, the 1974 reauthorization of OPIC
instructed the corporation to begin transferring its insurance pro-
grams to other risk sharing groups. 9
When OPIC activities were reviewed by Congress again in 1978,
the transfer requirement was repealed. 0 Although the removal of
this "privatization" requirement did restore OPIC's original author-
ity, other restrictions were invoked that reflected the contemporary
concerns of the Carter Administration." Most importantly, OPIC
was instructed to encourage the participation of "small business"
in its investment programs,' to give preferential consideration to
lesser developed countries (LDC's) with a per capita income of $520
or less in 1975 United States dollars, and to restrict its activities
was feared that OPIC's support of American financial projects had unnecessarily complicated
U.S. foreign policy toward those countries. Id. at 20 [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 676].
" Griffin, Transfer of OPIC's Investment Insurance Programs to Private Insurers: Pros-
pects and Proposals, 8 L. & POL. INT'L Bus. 641-43 (1976).
IS S. REP. No. 676, supra note 16, at 17.
" Overseas Private Investment Corporation Amendments Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-390,
S 2(1), 88 Stat. 763 (codified at 22 U.S.C. S 2194(AX2) (1976)) (repealed 1978). OPIC was to
begin transferring its insurance obligations to either private companies or to multilateral
organizations. It was to have divested 100%k of its expropriation and inconvertibility coverage
by Dec. 31, 1979.
' Overseas Private Investment Corporation Amendments Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-268,
92 Stat. 213, S 3(3) (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. SS 2191-2200a (Supp. IV 1980)). The
lack of success in the transfer of OPIC liabilities was due in large part to the aversion
of private companies either to assume OPIC's long-term liability (up to twenty years) or
to insure against losses which might be incurred in land-based wars. H.R. REP. No. 670,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1978) reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 618, 633.
" These provisions include instructions: (1) to decline to issue any contract of insurance
or reinsurance if it is determined that the investment "would be likely to cause a signifi-
cant reduction in the number of employees in the United States," 22 U.S.C. S 2191(1); to
refuse to support investors found to be in violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
of 1977, 22 U.S.C. S 2197(11); and to consider a country's record on human rights before
proceeding with a proposed project, 22 U.S.C. S 2199(1) (Supp. IV 1980).
f 22 U.S.C. S 2200 (1976). "Small business" is defined as any U.S. business not on the
Fortune 1000 (i.e., below $117 million in annual sales in 1979). GENERAL ACCOUNTING OF-
FICE, REPORT TO THE SEN. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, BY THE COMPTROLLER OF THE UNITED
STATES: THE OVERSEAS PRIVATE INVESTMENT CORPORATION: ITS ROLE IN DEVELOPMENT AND
TRADE, 57 n.1. (1981) [hereinafter cited as 1981 GAO REPORT] reprinted in Overseas Private
Investment Corporation: Hearings on S. 993 Before the Sen. Comm. on Foreign Relations,
97th Cong., 1st Sess. 10, 177 (1981) [hereinafter cited as 1981 OPIC Senate Hearings].
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in countries having a per capita income of $1000 or more in 1975
United States dollars."
The 1981 OPIC reauthorization amendment attempts both to con-
solidate and enlarge the scope of the original statutory mandate. 4
The salient features of the new legislation are: (1) a specific man-
date for OPIC activities to benefit United States trade; (2) a raise
in the per capita income levels for qualifying countries; (3) a new
category of political risk insurance covering "civil strife"; (4) new
statutory language concerning the propriety of extension of OPIC
benefits; and (5) the implementation of appropriations controls over
the amount of funds OPIC may allocate for financial assistance.25
Certain organizational and procedural changes also are made.26
In light of the past controversy concerning the proper role of
OPIC activities, perhaps the most significant new language is the
recognition and approval of the agency's promotion of United States
trade. As a criterion for determining whether to insure or finance
particular projects, OPIC now is directed "to seek to support those
development projects having positive trade benefits to the United
States."' Whereas the new provision is not expected to make a
dramatic change in current OPIC policy," its inclusion does acknow-
ledge one aspect of agency activity that has been characterized
at times as an improper consideration in making decisions affect-
ing foreign development assistance.' While development assistance
remains the prime objective of OPIC, the new provision in effect
gives the agency congressional authority to evaluate the overall
possibilities of United States trade benefits flowing from a par-
ticular project and factor those benefits into its selection process.0
Significantly, it should be noted that the original proposal by the
22 U.S.C. S 2191(2) (1976).
2 Pub. L. No. 97-65, supra note 4.
See generally H.R. REP. No. 195, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 11-13 (1981).
Pub. L. No. 97-65, supra note 4. These include: an increase in the number of OPIC
directors to fifteen by the addition of an official of the Department of Labor and a second
member representing small business, S 3(aXl); the appointment of the U.S. Trade Represen-
tative to serve as Vice Chairman, ex officio, S 3(a)(2); technical changes in OPIC accounting
practices, S 6; the removal of earlier prohibitions against risk-sharing agreements with
private insurers, S 4(b)(2); and the lifting of 1978 restrictions on the support of projects
involving the extraction of copper, S 8(3). Similarly 1978 restrictions against the support
of projects involved in the processing or production of palm oil, sugar, or citrus crops were
deleted.
Pub. L. No. 97-65, supra note 4, S 2(2) (to be codified at 22 U.S.C. S 2191(i)).
28 S. REP. No. 83, supra note 7, at 23.
See generally 1981 OPIC House Hearings, supra note 8, at 37.
o 1981 OPIC Senate Hearings, supra note 22, at 128.
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Reagan Administration called for an even stronger emphasis on
trade benefits than did the final version. 1
In evaluating foreign development versus investor services, OPIC
inherently must serve two masters. As a matter of long-range
policy, its acknowledged primary purpose is to assist development
processes in the poorest areas of the world. 2 In matters of day-to-
day operation, however, OPIC's business is to provide risk coverge
and financial support to investment projects in countries and areas
where investors or private insurers ordinarily would be disinclined
to operate." The problem is one of striking a balance between two
seemingly inconsistent goals. Before OPIC can fulfill its primary
purpose, prospective investors first must be convinced that a profit
can be made in those countries eligible for OPIC programs. One
effective stimulus of interest in a particular project is the poten-
tial for future exports of additional parts and materials to supply
the new project upon its completion. However, as this and other
investment initiatives are inherent phenomena of a free market
system, the inclusion of "positive U.S. trade benefits" in the OPIC
objectives merely codifies, in a sense, a pre-existing defacto con-
sideration. While no substantive change may result, a legal recogni-
tion of an OPIC trade mandate should end the debate over the
incompatibility of trade promotion and development assistance.
The new legislation also raises the per capita income limitations
set by the 1978 amendments.35 OPIC is now instructed to give
preferential consideration to projects in LDC's having a per capita
income of $680 or less in 1979 United States dollars and to restrict
its activities in countries having a per capita income of $2950 or
more in 1979 United States dollars.' This differs from the original
Administration request, which would have removed all income level
restrictions and simply instructed preferential consideration for
31 Although identical language is found in both versions, the Administration bill positioned
the new provision in the new opening "purposes" section of the law, making it appear
to be of co-equal importance to development assistance. See H.R. 3136, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
S 2(2) (1981). The House Subcommittee however thought it wiser to make the provision
a part of a later "criteria" section of the law, apparently in an effort to modify its impact
and to make its inclusion less controversial when the bill came before the full House. 1981
OPIC House Hearings, supra note 8, at 188-89.
' See generally Note, 10 L. & POL. INT'L Bus. 287, 300 (1978).
' Id. at 301.
" See 1981 OPIC Senate Hearings, supra note 22, at 154-55. But see 1981 GAO Report,
supra note 22, at 28, which finds that OPIC guidelines allow other industrial countries
to export as much as U.S. suppliers since the guidelines only cover mutual procurements.
' Pub. L. No. 97-65, supra note 4. S 2(1) (to be codified at 22 U.S.C. 2191(2)).
36 Id.
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countries having a per capita income of $625 or less in 1975 United
States dollars."7 The per capita ceiling, albeit at a higher level, was
reinstated by Congress apparently as a compromise strategy to
avoid floor debate rather than as an affirmative effort to reduce
OPIC's operational capacity." This view is underscored by the con-
tinuing vitality of the OPIC "exceptions" policy regarding upper
income level restrictions."9 OPIC may disregard this restriction
when a particular project promises either significant trade benefits
to the United States or an extraordinarily significant development
benefit to the host country. 0
As these exceptions attest, OPIC reserves considerable flexibility
in the application of any definite income ceiling on its operations.
Moreover, it should be noted that OPIC may operate in any coun-
try where a national security interest is involved.' OPIC essen-
tially will be able to continue treating the upper income level figure
as only a rough approximation of the range of OPIC operations,
not a strict prohibition. Nevertheless, this expansion of the for-
mal list of eligible countries does symbolize the greater role OPIC
is expected to play in development assistance. It may assist in at-
tracting the attention of investors who might not otherwise be
aware of the existing exceptions policy or, if aware, might be uncer-
tain whether their proposed project would qualify as an exception.
It is, of course, in the interest of the agency to extend the range
of eligible countries to attain prudent risk management.' In order
to provide preferential consideration to high-risk, low-income coun-
" H.R. 3136, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. S 2(3) (1981).
' 1981 OPIC House Hearings, supra note 8, at 189, 190. Countries restored under the
reauthorization are:
Cyprus Portugal Panama
French Guiana Romania Turkey
Malta Costa Rica Jamaica
Surinam Brazil Argentina
Yugoslavia Fiji Korea
Barbados Chile
Id. at 171.
" See 1981 OPIC House Hearings, supra note 8, at 156; see also 127 CONG. REC. 510500
(daily ed. Sept. 25, 1981) (remarks by Sen. Percy).
" A full catalog of exceptions are: (1) energy resource and development projects in non-
OPIC countries; and mineral exploration, mining, and processing projects; (2) projects by
U.S. small business and cooperatives; (3) reinsurance of private underwriters of political
risk insurance; (4) insurance for letters of credit for U.S. exporters or contractors; (5) pro-
jects promising significant net trade benefits; and (6) projects promising an extra-ordinarily
significant development benefit. S. REP. No. 83, supra note 7, 22.
22 U.S.C. S 2199(1) (Supp. IV 1980).
' 1981 OPIC Senate Hearing, supra note 22, at 151 (statement of Gerald T. West, former
President, OPIC).
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tries, OPIC must be able to offset those risks against projects in
more highly developed, relatively low-risk countries in balancing
its liabilities. While such purely business considerations may im-
pinge on broader policy objectives, OPIC nevertheless is statutor-
ily required to conduct its operations on a sound business footing."
OPIC's justification is that the larger revenues it receives from
projects in the more developed countries provide more available
funds for projects in the poorer areas."4
The Administration also recommended the addition of the term
"civil strife" to the war, revolution, and insurrection coverage.'"
OPIC urged the necessity of this language to fill the extant gap
in coverage between the political risk insurance available from
OPIC and the traditional casualty insurance offered by commer-
cial carriers."" Whereas the pre-existing political risk insurance
covered losses resulting from military actions of either revolu-
tionary forces or government defenders, it did not cover property
damage in cases where the action was not initiated or directed
by any organized group, or where the removal or elimination of
the host government was not the prime objective. 7
Because "civil strife" insurance generally is not offered by the
private sector, Congress' approach to the proposed new coverage
was cautious." The suggestion of the Senate was that private in-
surers be encouraged to participate on a risk sharing basis with
OPIC in the insuring of investments against "civil strife."4 9 Fur-
ther, an amendment was added requiring a complete report from
OPIC within sixty days of the issuance of the first contract, such
report to include: (1) definition of the losses to be covered in the
contract; (2) proposed rates for coverage; and (3) an estimate of
possible claims.1 An additional report is required whenever OPIC
significantly modifies the scope of the coverage."
It should be noted that the Act does not define "civil strife."
, 22 U.S.C. SS 2191(a), (d) (1976).
" 1981 OPIC House Hearings, supra note 8, at 114 (statement of Craig A. Nalen, Presi-
dent of OPIC).
4' H.R. 3136, supra note 37, S 4(l).
"' 1981 OPIC House Hearings, supra note 8, at 119-20.
47 Id.
" Id. at 170. (comments of Craig A. Nalen, President of OPIC, during statement of An-
thony Marra, General Counsel, OPIC). However the Subcommittee noted that such coverage
is offered by the U.S. Export-Import Bank and the Foreign Credit Insurance Agency to
U.S. exports. H.R. REP. 195, supra note 25, at 8.
19 S. REP. No. 83, supra note 7, at 66.
1 Pub. L. No. 97-65, supra note 4, S 4(a)(4) (to be codified at 22 U.S.C. S 2194(a)(4)).
51 Id.
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While OPIC officials have intimated that the term contemplates
acts by terrorist groups or attacks aimed at United States
property,52 its precise meaning is open to question.' OPIC explains
this ambiguity as an acceptable insurance practice whereby the
specific meaning and coverage of a term are decided in the negotia-
tion process and agreed on in the contract.'
While the House committee was in basic agreement with the
proposals of the Administration bill, the Senate demanded addi-
tional procedural restrictions on the OPIC project selection
process.5" Language was introduced requiring OPIC consideration
of concepts of "additionality" and "performance requirements" in
its decision-making process."
"Additionality" connotes a determination of the viability of a
particular project absent the availability of OPIC insurance or finan-
cial assistance. 7 The rationale for this concern is that OPIC should
limit its activities in developing countries to those projects that
would not otherwise be feasible without the benefit of OPIC
support.58 OPIC opposed this amendment,59 maintaining that it
would be impossible to isolate and quantify any one factor in the
decision-making process to determine whether its presence would
tip the balance in favor of a particular project.' The OPIC argu-
ment persuaded the Senate to discard "additionality" as a criterion
for project selection in favor of a provision requiring OPIC to fur-
nish a report to Congress no later than June 30, 1982 on methods
of estimating the probability that particular investments will pro-
ceed if OPIC services are not provided." In effect, a compromise
was reached whereby immediate implementation of the require-
ment was postponed for further study. If additionality requirements
are to be included at a later time, additional legislation will be
necessary; however, it is not altogether unlikely that OPIC may
' 1981 OPIC House Hearings, supra note 8, at 169. (statement of Anthony Marra, General
Counsel, OPIC). An example offered was a Palestinian attack on an American owned fac-
tory in Jordan where the attack was to protest the Camp David Agreements rather than
as an attempt to oust the Jordanian government. Id. at 170.
53 Id.
Id. at 193 (Subcomm. Markup).
5 S. REP. No. 83, supra note 7, at 25, 26.
w Id.
' See generally id. at 249 (statement of C. Fred Bergsten, former member OPIC Board
of Directors).
11 S. REP. No. 83, supra note 7, at 25.
9 Id.
' 1981 OPIC House Hearings, supra note 8, at 124 (statement of Craig A. Nalen, Presi-
dent of OPIC).
" Pub. L. No. 97-65, supra note 4, S 9(b) (to be codified at 22 U.S.C. S 2200a).
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begin to make "additionality" evaluations of its own in an effort
to moderate the issue.
The second Senate proposal, relating to performance require-
ments, remained intact. OPIC shall "refuse to insure, reinsure or
finance any investment subject to performance requirements which
would reduce substantially the positive trade benefits likely to ac-
crue to the United States from the investment." 2 "Investment in-
centives and performance requirements, usually as part of a com-
prehensive package, are offered by foreign governments to in-
fluence international investment and trade decisions."' The con-
cern evidenced in the Senate was that these contractual obliga-
tions distort the true measure of market forces and hamper ef-
forts to effect a balance of trade." OPIC took the position that
such a provision would be ineffective, as LDC development would
be affected adversely and United States investors subjected to more
government intervention. 5 OPIC also argued that the exclusion
of United States investors from these projects would allow in-
vestors from other industrialized countries to accept the perfor-
mance requirements and proceed with the project.' OPIC suggested
that an overall United States policy dealing with this problem would
be more appropriate than placing the burden on OPIC to make
these considerations." On this issue, however, the Senate remained
unpersuaded.
While plans to implement this new provision are not yet for-
mulated, it should be noted that only performance requirements
that substantially" reduce positive trade benefits are proscribed.
Presumably, there first must be a threshold finding of positive
United States trade benefits in the transaction before the restric-
tion will become operative. Upon such a finding, OPIC then will
determine whether particular incentives or performance require-
ments substantially reduce trade benefits. Considering its basic
opposition to this provision, 9 it appears likely that OPIC general-
Id. 2(3Xc).
1981 OPIC House Hearings, supra note 8, at 128.
See S. REP. No. 83, supra note 8, at 26.
1981 OPIC House Hearings, supra note 8, at 129.
"See id.
See id. at 130.
6 Compare Pub. L. 97-65, supra note 4, S 2(3)(c) with S. REP. No. 83, supra note 7, at 123.
In the compromise agreement worked out between the House and Senate, the adverb
"significantly" was replaced with "substantially". Presumably this slight alteration would
allow OPIC greater discretion in approving such agreements.
" See 1981 OPIC House Hearings, supra note 8, at 172 (Mr. Nalen, President of OPIC,
commenting during the statement of Anthony Marra, General Counsel, OPIC).
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ly will attempt to minimize the effect of the restriction absent
egregious demands by host governments. While OPIC must for-
mulate the guidelines by which such agreements are evaluated,
a great deal of subjectivity will be explicit in the evaluation.
A further significant change in the new Act establishes congres-
sional budgetary control over the amounts OPIC may issue through
its loan programs." While the actual funds to be disbursed need
not be appropriated, commitments to guarantee loans are "author-
ized for any fiscal year only to the extent or in such amounts as
provided in advance in appropriations Acts."71 This provision
replaces prior statutory language that merely disallowed com-
mitments resulting in a "fractional reserve less than 25 per cen-
tum of the maximum contingent liability then outstanding." 2 This
modification is in compliance with a pre-existing provision in the
Act that expressly allows Congress to limit OPIC obligations in
consideration of budgetary programs submitted by the President."
These budgetary controls, however, have not been viewed as a
reflection on OPIC's past performance or activities, ' but rather
as a part of a broader Administration policy to tighten controls
on all federal programs."
Subject to the same appropriations act control is the direct invest-
ment fund. Noteworthy here is the fact that the Administration
originally proposed that this program of direct loans to qualifying
investors be terminated. The House objected to this proposal,
viewing the program as particularly well-equipped to carry out
OPIC's obligation to involve small business in foreign investment.7
Therefore, the final version of the bill reinstated the direct loan
program under new procedures that maintain its operations roughly
at its current level. 8 However, Congress retains the authority now
to terminate either loan program in any year simply by placing
a zero dollar amount on allowable funds to be earmarked for the
program."
70 Pub. L. No. 97-65, supra note 4, S 5(c) (to be codified at 22 U.S.C. S 2194).
71 Id.
7" 22 U.S.C. 2195(a)(2).
" 22 U.S.C. 2195(a)(3).
7' 1981 OPIC House Hearings, supra note 8, at 195 (comments of Bingham in the Sub-
comm. Markup).
75 Id.
7 Id. at 196 (comments of Mr. Lagomarsino in the Subcomm. Markup).
77 See H.R. REP. No. 195, supra note 25, at 8-9.
71 1981 OPIC House Hearings, supra note 8, at 196 (comments of Mr. Lagomarsino in
the Subcomm. Markup).
' Pub. L. No. 97-65, supra note 4, S 5(c) (to be codified at 22 U.S.C. 2194). This was originally
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Closely related to these budgetary controls is a measure that
required OPIC to return to the Treasury all funds that were ap-
propriated for start-up costs prior to January 1, 1975.80 OPIC must
pay back each year amounts equal to 25% of the net income received
for the preceding year. Although this provision could slow the
accumulation of OPIC reserves and surplus capital, the corpora-
tion's financial position appears secure, and a long-term repayment
process would not impair OPIC operations seriously." Indeed, repay-
ment is required to be in a manner consistent with OPIC objectives.8
The enactment of the 1981 Reauthorization Act, combined with
a new fiscal awareness and declared policy of greater private sec-
tor participation, would seem to bode well for the future of OPIC.
With this reauthorization, OPIC appears to have moved beyond
the initial experimental stage in which many newly created agen-
cies are most vulnerable to political whims and criticisms. While
OPIC concededly occupies a rather narrow field of operation within
the total scheme of United States foreign aid policy, its prospects
at this time are especially good for assuming a greater role in both
United States trade promotion and development assistance pro-
grams. If the current emphasis on private sector participation is
more than rhetoric, the success or failure of OPIC in achieving
its designated goals is likely to be a subject of continuing interest
in the coming years.
Doug Wessinger
the method chosen to phase out the direct investment fund. 1981 OPIC Senate Hearing,
supra note 30, at 209 (statement of Gerald T. West).
Pub. L. No. 97-65, supra note 4 S 10 (to be codified at 22 U.S.C. 2200b).
I /d.
', In 1980, OPIC realized a net profit of $64.7 million. S. REP. No. 83, supra note 7, at 21.
Pub. L. No. 97-65, supra note 4, S 10 (to be codified at 22 U.S.C. S 2200(b)).
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